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THE QUESTIONABLE STATUS OF

THE CHARITABLE IMM UNITY
ROBERT At. WESTBERG

Until 1953, charitable corporations in Washington enjoyed a limited
immunity from tort liability. Until 1953, the extent of the immunity
thus enjoyed was well enough defined so that the practitioner was
assured that his predictions as to the outcome of future litigation would
be reasonably accurate. However, two recent Washington cases dealing
with the charitable immunity doctrine have effected the removal of
much of the certainty from this area of the law, and thus prompt an
analysis of the charitable immunity and its practical effect today.
In the normal situation, liability will result from negligent or otherwise tortious conduct which injures another. Immunity is the exception. Moreover, charity is generally no defense to tort. "Charity
suffereth long and is kind, but in the common law it cannot be careless.
When it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes actionable wrongdoing."'
The earliest American case holding a charity to be immune from tort
liability is McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital.' From that
decision sprang the trust fund theory of charitable immunity which has
evolved into one of the most confused areas of the law today. It would
be futile to attempt to categorize the many directions in which the
courts have gone in an effort to analyze the problems in the field.3 Nor
is the confusion limited to that caused by variant state rules. Even in
Washington, while the results have, until recently, been predictable,
the analyses have defied logical examination or classification.
'President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F2d 810, 813
(D.C.Cir. 1942). See also Tribble v. Missionary Sisters, 137 Wash. 326, 242 Pac. 373
(1926) (paying patient allowed recovery against charitable hospital for its negligence
in the selection of a nurse) ; Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wn2d 204, 105 P.2d
32 (1940) (charitable hospital held liable to paying patient for failure to furnish proper
equipment) ; Heckman v. Sisters of Charity, 5 Wn2d 699, 106 P.2d 593 (1940) (charitable hospital held liable to invitee for negligence of employees).
2 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
Actually, the immunity doctrine is
derived from the dictum of Lord Cottenham in The Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v.
Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846). An excellent summary of
the historical background of the rule, including its adoption in the United States after
its repudiation in England, is set forth in President and Directors of Georgetown
College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 815-817 (D.C.Cir. 1942).
3 A complete annotation on the subject appears in 25 A.L.R2d 29 (1952). A rather
thorough review of the doctrine, with specific reference to its application in Washington, is outlined in the majority opinion of Pierce v. Yakima Valley Etc. Ass'n.,
43 Wn.2d 162, 260 P2d 765 (1953).
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From 1893, the date of the decision of Richardson v. Carbon Hill
Coal Co.,' the rule in Washington was that a charitable hospital owed
no duty of care to its patients, whether they pay or not, beyond the
duty to exercise reasonable care in the selection and retention of its
employees, and the duty to furnish proper equipment.' However, in
1953, the case of Pierce v. Yakima Valley Etc. Ass'n.' effected a modification of the doctrine, the total effect of which remains to be determined. Plaintiff, a paying patient in the defendant hospital, had been
permanently injured by the negligence of a nurse. There was no allegation that the hospital had been negligent in the selection or retention of
the nurse. The lower court, acting on the authority of Weiss v. Swedish
Hospital,7 sustained a demurrer of the defendant and dismissed the
complaint. Plaintiff declined to plead further, and the supreme court
had before it the following question: "Where a paying patient of a
charitable, non-profit hospital sustains injuries by reason of the negligence of a nurse, may such patient recover damages from the hospital?" 8 In an opinion by Judge Hamley, the supreme court answered
the question in the affirmative, overruled the demurrer, and seemingly
repudiated the rule of charitable immunity in this state.'
The Pierce case itself furnishes the strongest argument against the
rule of charitable immunity in any form. It is therefore somewhat
disconcerting to see the court very soon thereafter arrive at a decision
which represents, perhaps, not only an unnecessary throwback to the
old rule but also leaves the practitioner devoid of any guidepost by
which to predict the result of future litigation. The short decision
which accomplishes this is Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free
0 The facts of the Lyon case were these. Plaintiff, an eleven
Church."
year old boy, was on his way to Sunday school-a passenger on the
46 Wash. 52, 32 Pac. 1012, 20 L.R.A. 338 (1893).
5Negligence in the selection and retention of employees, and in the furnishing of
equipment, has been termed "administrative negligence." The effect of the limited
immunity rule in Washington prior to the Pierce case has been to allow recovery for
"administrative negligence" of the charitable corporation, but not for the negligence
of its servants.
643 Wn2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
7

16 Wn.2d 446, 133 P.2d 978 (1943)

(paying patient denied recovery against

charitable hospital in the absence of showing of negligence in the selection of the
employee, or some other kind of "administrative negligence").

843 Wn.2d 162, 260 P2d 765 (1953).
9In th 1955 edition of PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955), Dean Prosser took the Pierce
case as abolishing the rule in Washington. That is, he took the case as overruling

the rule completely, but recognized the possibility, as shown by his use of the word
"apparently" in the footnote, that the court might later attempt to limit the decision

to its facts. See PROSSER, TORTS § 109 (2d ed. 1955).
1047 Wn2d 202, 287 P,2d 128 (1955), petition for reh. den., 47 Wn.2d 204
P.2d(1955).

1956]

THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY

ancient school bus of the defendant. The defendant was an incorporated, non-profit, religious organization. While driving along a narrow road the driver edged the bus to the right to allow an on-coming
car to pass by on the left. The bus scratched against the brush which
was leaning over the roadway and ran into a log or stick which was
lying in the brush. The log came through the door of the bus,
striking the plaintiff and injuring him. At the close of the plaintiff's
case, the trial judge sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
ground that the plaintiff could not maintain an action in tort against
the defendant charitable, non-profit corporation. 1
On appeal the plaintiff relied (with no little justification) on the
decision of the Pierce case. The court said, however, that that decision
"did not reject the rule of charitable immunty, but merely modified
it."' 2 It then said: "We do not wish to extend [the holding in the
Pierce case] to apply to a non-profit, religious organization which
transports children, without charge, to and from Sunday school in order
that they may receive a spiritual education and eventually become
members of the church organization."' 3
To the writer, the result of the case is undesirable both as to the
parties involved in the litigation, as well as for the uncertainty which it
creates as to the rule of charitable immunity. Though the decision in
the Pierce case can be taken, as all other cases, to hold no more than
necessary for the decision of the problem presented by the facts of the
case, the opinion in that case so effectively destroyed the rationale of
the charitable immunity rule that the more recent case is left with
nothing to support it. Moreover, the court in the Lyon case made no
attempt to substantiate it or show why the reasons advanced for rejecting the rule in the Piercecase were inapplicable in the Lyon case.
Following are some quotations from the Pierce opinion which raise
questions and arguments left unanswered by the inadequate opinion
in the Lyon case:
In this case, it is correct to say that
the 'reason' originally given for the
4
rule of immunity never did exist.'
... we are convinced that none of such theories provides a sound or

logical basis for the rule of immunity.' 5

1 The other ground for the dismissal was that of a failure of proof of negligence.
In view of its position on the first ground, the supreme court did not find it necessary
to discuss the question of negligence.
12 47 Wn2d 202,204, 287 P.2d 128,129 (1955).
13 Id. at 204, 287 P.2d at 130.
14 43 Wn2d 162,167, 260 P.2d 765,768 (1953).
15 Id. at 168-169, 260 P.2d at 769.
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The almost unanimous view expressed in the recent decisions of our
sister states is that, in so far as the rule of immunity was ever justified
because of the need of financial encouragement and protection, changed
conditions have rendered the rule no longer necessary."
We recognize, of course, that not all present day hospitals are large and
well-financed, and that there are some hospitals today which render a
great deal of gratuitous service.... Nor do we overlook the fact that the
principles with which we are dealing have application also to such organizations as Y.M.C.A.'s, Y.W.C.A.'s, and Red Cross. Such organizations
have benefited much less than hospitals from changed economic conditions and social outlook.
The public policy with which we are concerned, however, must be based
upon general conditions and the average situation. It cannot be designed
to meet exceptional cases or deal with particular instances of hardship.17
'What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned, is the cost of reasonable protection, the amount of the insurance premium as an added
burden on its finances, not the awarding over in damages of its entire
8
assets./
'... it is a principle of law, as well as of morals, that men must be just
before they are generous;...,19
The opinion in the Lyon case offers no answers to these statements.
In fact, nothing was answered by that opinion beyond the fact that the
defendant was not to be held liable. The unwillingness of the court to
"extend" the holding of the Pierce case beyond its bare facts provides
no basis for determining the reasons on which the decision in the Lyon
case was based.
Historically, there are five theories on which courts have, from time
to time, been able to rationalize their favoritism toward charities. The
most common, and the earliest, is the "trust fund" theory, in regard to
which it has been said: "To give damages out of a trust fund would not
be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view,
but would divert it to a completely different purpose."" Obviously,
this cannot be the basis of the immunity in Washington. The decision
in the Pierce case, as well as many previous decisions demonstrates that
the trust fund may be "diverted" if the plaintiff suing is not a beneficiary of the charity' or if the negligence of the defendant is "adminis16 Id. at 169, 260 P.2d at 769.
17 Id. at 171, 260 P.2d at 770.

is Id. at 172, 260 P.2d at 771.
'9 Id. at 173, 260 P2d at 771.
20 The Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 513, 8 Eng. Rep.
1508, 1510 (H.L. 1846).
21 Kalinowski v. Y.W.C.A., 17 Wn.2d 380, 135 P.2d 852 (1943) ; Hecknan v. Sisters
of Charity, 5 Wn.2d 699, 106 P.2d 593 (1940) (invitee).
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trative" negligence 2 or is negligence in the selection or retention of its
employees."
The second theory given for the granting of the immunity is that the
doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to charitable corporations, apparently on the theory that the charity does not derive profits
from the services of its employees, and thus should not be liable for
their acts.24 This theory is plainly inconsistent with the allowance of
recovery not only in the Pierce case but also in other Washington cases
where the plaintiff was allowed to recover for the negligence of the
employees of the defendant charity where the plaintiff was, for example,
an invitee." Moreover, it is inconsistent with the law of agency, for the
liability imposed on an employer under the doctrine of respondeat
superior is no more based on the fact that the employer derives profits
from the services of his employees than on the fact that the employer
has control over their actions.2 6
The third theory on which recovery has been denied in cases involving charitable corporations is the theory of "governmental immunity";
that the charitable institution, because of the public nature of the work
in which it engages is entitled to the same immunity that is granted
governmental bodies. 7 This theory is subject to the same criticism as
that raised against the first two, viz., that the theory is inconsistent
with the cases which allow recovery against charities. 8 No Washington
cases have been discovered which have granted immunity on the theory
of governmental immunity.
The fourth theory proposed for the granting of the immunity is that
of implied waiver or assumption of risk. A waiver is the intentional or
voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as warrants
22 Clampett v. Sisters of Charity, 17 NVn.2d 652, 136 P.2d 729 (1943)
(failure to
furnish proper equipment).
Tribble v. Missionary Sisters, 137 Wash. 326, 242 Pac. 372 (1926).
' See, e.g., Backman v. Y.W.C.A., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922).
2ZSee note 21, supra.
z Mechem suggests that the real reason for the rule of respondeat superior is
neither the benefit nor the control theory. Rather, he argues that the rule is invoked
because in mot cases the master furnishes the opportunity and facilities for the harm
done. "In most instances, the master gives the servant facilities for doing harm which
he would not otherwise have.... [T]he master, by entrusting him with such equipment,
enormously increases his potentiality for doing harm. Likewise, although no instrumentalities are involved, the nature of the job may increase the individual's capacity
to make trouble." MECHEm, OUTINEs OF AGENCY § 354 (1952). See also Ray v.
Tucson, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
27 See, e.g., University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219, 14
L.R.A. (n.s.) 784 (1907) (holding that charitable institutions are exempt from
liability for negligent injuries to patients on the ground that they are mere instrumentalities acting in the performance of a governmental or public duty.)
2- See notes 25, 26, supra.
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the inference of the relinquishment of such right." It is clear that
resting the immunity on waiver demands utilization of a fiction at best.
Even should the patient enter the hospital competent and conscious, no
such "waiver" could reasonably be termed voluntary."
With reference to the theories which are outlined above, the court, in
the Pierce case said:
...[T]he only substantive reason which has been relied upon by this
court is the basic reason of public policy. It will therefore serve no useful
purpose to here enter into a detailed discussion of those other theories. It
will suffice to say that the leading decisional and text authorities dealing
with them have been examined, and we are convinced that none of such
theories provides a sound or logical basis for the rule of immunity.31
The basic reason of public policy is, of course, the only substantial
reason for which the immunity is granted in any case. However, the
so-called "public policy" theory, in reality, is not a theory at all, but
rather a statement of the fact of immunity without resort to theoretical
justifications which are themselves statements of policy in theoretical
form. The public policy rule in effect permits a court to adopt whatever
rule it sees fit in the absence of a specific legislative declaration on the
issue.
The essence of the reasons of policy in Washington prior to the
Pierce case was ably set out in Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital' to be
the stimulation and encouragement given by the immunity to the establishment and maintenance of institutions by private charitable corporations. This reason might still be persuasive were it not for the decision
in the Pierce case. There, the court said: "The almost unanimous view
expressed in the recent decisions of our sister states is that, in so far as
the rule of immunity was ever justified because of the need of financial
encouragement and protection, changed conditions have rendered the
rule no longer necessary.""3 This is not the language of a court which
is setting out to modify the rule. It is a flat rejection of it.
It has been argued, also on the broad ground of public policy, that
the recovery of a large tort claim against a charity could mean the
awarding over in damages of the entire assets of the charity to the
claimant. Superficially, this argument is persuasive, but the parade of
29

BLACK, LAW DIcrioNARY (4th ed. 1951).
30 See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 826

(D.C.Cir. 1942).
3143 Wn.2d 162, 168-169, 260 P2d 765, 769 (1953).
3299 Wash. 399, 169 Pac. 828 (1918).
:3

43 Wn.2d at 169, 260 P.2d at 769.

19561

THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY

horrors raised by it has never occurred in fact. As it was aptly pointed
out in the Pierce decision:
Perhaps the best way of determining whether the charitable institutions of
today need the 'encouragement and stimulation' which immunity affords,
is to examine what has happened to them in jurisdictions where the
immunity rule does not prevail. We have found nothing in the decisional
law of this country to indicate,by statistics or otherwise, that undue hardships or calamities have befallen them. This same observation has fre-

quently been made by other courts and text writers.3 4 (emphasis supplied)
It is pertinent here to mention the present-day availability of
liability insurance. Clearly, the existence of liability insurance can and
does have an effect upon the determination of the proper public policy.35
While it has been the position of the Washington court-and indeed the
position of the majority of courts-that the existence of liability insurance will not create liability where none existed before, 36 it has been
frequently pointed out that the fact that the charity could obtain
liability insurance will be taken into effect in determining, as a matter
of policy, whether the immunity rule should be retained. Perhaps the
most oft-quoted statement on this point is that made by Rutledge, J.
in Presidentand Directorsof Georgetown College v. Hughes," wherein
he said: "What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned, is the
cost of reasonable protection, the amount of the insurance premium as
an added burden on its finances, not the awarding over in damages of
its entire assets." 38
Frequently a court may reach the stage where it recognizes that there
exists in fact no valid reason for the granting of the immunity, but
succumbs to the argument that the rule is such an important part of the
public policy of the state that it should not be abolished except by act
of the legislature. 3 This argument was unsuccessfully urged upon the
Washington court in the recent case of Borst v. .Borst,4" involving an
immunity of a somewhat different sort. The action in the Borst case
was brought by the minor son of the defendant for damages sustained
Id. at 171, 260 P.2d at 770.
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 823-824
(D.C.Cir. 1942).
36 Susmann v. Y.M.C.A., 101 Wash. 487, 495, 172 Pac. 554, 557 (1918), "The taking
of indemnity insurance was but the exercise of business prudence. At any rate, it could
create no liability where none before existed...
37 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir. 1942).
: Id. at 824.
See the concurring opinion of Robinson, J. in Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis,
5 Wn.2d 204, 105 P.2d 32 (1940).
-1 41 Wn.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
"
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when the defendant negligently drove his partnership truck over the
plaintiff. In allowing the recovery, the court discarded a rule which had
been the law in Washington for forty-seven years, and in so doing,
rejected the argument that such action was proper only for the legislature. Said the court: "Where the proposal is to open the doors of the
court, rather than to close them, the courts are quite competent to act
for themselves." 41 In commenting on the Borst case in the Pierce
opinion, Judge Hamley, writing for the majority said,
In Borst we overturned a rule of immunity which had stood since 1905.
...The decision in the Borst case reached a decision contrary to the rule
followed by the great majority of decisions dealing with the subject there
under review. It did so, as we do here, on the basis of an examination of
the reasons behind the42generally accepted rule and the discovery that
they are without merit.

The Lyon case, coming as it did after Pierce, can certainly not be
explained on the ground that the court preferred to leave such action
to the legislature.
As this discussion has indicated, the Pierce case put the entire basis
of the immunity rule in Washington on public policy, then rejected the
rule. It is very difficult to determine what policy reasons were present
in the Lyon case where the immunity was granted that were not present
in the previous decision denying it. The cases are distinguishable, true,
but any attempt to reconcile the decisions on the basis of the distinguishing facts would require reliance on factors which are totally unsatisfactory as legal bases for the granting of the immunity. Moreover,
such an attempt would of necessity create insoluble practical problems.
The most obvious distinguishing factor is that of payment. The
dissent in the Pierce case stated:
Parenthetically, the new rule adopted in the majority opinion applies
only to a paying patient (a term which is not defined therein), and I
assume that the original rule will still remain operative as to free patrons
able to pay only
of charitable institutions and those who are financially
43
part of the prevailing rate for the service rendered.
Prior to the decision in the Pierce case, payment was immaterial as a
factor to determine whether the immunity should be granted to the
charity.44 In many of the cases cited, the issue of payment was raised
41 Id. at 657, 251 P.2d at 157.

Wn.2d at 179, 260 P2d at 775.
Id. at 183, 260 P2d at 776.
-1 Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235 (1913) ; Magnuson v. Swedish
Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 169 Pac. 828 (1918) ; Canney v. Sisters of Charity, 15 Wn.2d
325, 130 P.2d 899 (1942) ; Weiss v. Swedish Hospital, 16 Wn.2d 446, 133 P.2d 978
(1943). In the Magnuson case, the court, holding that the factor of payment was
4243

43
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by the plaintiff in an attempt to show that the defendant was not
actually a charity." It has been uniformly held in Washington, however, that the fact of payment will not destroy the charitable nature of
the institution." Aside from the question whether payment will destroy
the charitable nature of the institution, the fact of payment as affecting
the rigfit of the plaintiff to recover presents real problems of public
policy as well as of practical application. Should the charity owe a
higher duty to the patient who can afford the services which he receives
than to one who cannot? In some states, the answer is yes. In those
states in which the distinction is made between the paying and the nonpaying patient for the purpose of granting or denying the immunity,
the paying patient is thrown into the same class as the stranger and both
are allowed recovery.W The reasoning behind this rule has been that
the paying patient is not the beneficiary of the charity. However, this
rule is not supported in reason,4" and it has been demonstrated that the
paying patient is a beneficiary of the charity as well as the non-paying
patient, the difference being only one of degree. Moreover, such a distinction is unjust. As one able jurist remarked:
Abolition of the immunity as to the paying patient is the last short step
immaterial, said that the amount received does not go toward private gain, but rather
to more effectively accomplish the purposes for which the charity was formed. Quoting
at length from the case of Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed.
294, 65 L.R.A. 372 (1st Cir. 1901), the court raised many of the problems which appear
if the factor of payment is made material to the question of the granting of the
immunity. "The plaintiff was what is sometimes called a 'paying patient,' the rate
of her payment being fourteen dollars a week. Upon this ground her counsel has
sought to distinguish her case from that of a patient in the hospital who pays nothing.
In our opinion, the difference is immaterial. As has been said, the defendant was a
charitable corporation; that is, a corporation organized exclusively for charity. That
the ministrations of such a hospital should be confined exclusively to the indigent is not
usual or desirable. Those of moderate means from necessity, and not a few rich people
from choice, resort to great charitable hospitals for treatment, especially in surgical
cases. Throughout the world this is the custom in these institutions, whether they are
maintained by individual, religious, or municipal charity. From patients who are not
indigent, a payment is commonly permitted or required. Commonly, and in the case
at bar, quite manifestly, this payment does not make full pecuniary compensation for
the services rendered. Those who make a considerable payment not infrequently receive
in some respects a more expensive service than do those who make a small payment
or none at all; but the payment required is usually calculated on the patient's ability
to pay rather than upon the whole cost of the treatment he receives.... In our opinion,
a paying patient in the defendant hospital, as well as a non-paying patient, seeks and
receives the services of a public charity. That such a hospital in its treatment of a rich
patient shall be held to a greater degree of care than in its treatment of pauper is not
to be tolerated. Certain luxuries may be given the former that the latter does not get,
and this for various reasons; but the degree of protection from unskilled and careless
nurses must be the same in both cases." at pp. 403-404.
45 See text, infra.
41 See note 44, supra.
47 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924).
48 Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294, 65 L.R.A. 372 (1st
Cir. 190).
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but one to extinction. Retention for the non-paying patient is the least
defensible and most unfortunate of the distinction's refinements. He,
least of all, is able to bear the burden. More than all others, he has no
choice. He is the last person the donor would wish to go without indemnity. With everyone else protected, the additional burden of protecting
him cannot break the trust. He should be the first to have reparation, not
last and least among those who receive it. So stripped of foundation, the
distinction falls. It should fall in line with, not away from, the trend which
has brought it about. The immunity should go and the object of the
49
charity should be placed on a par with all others.
If the Washington court is, at least for the present, prepared to base
the difference between recovery and non-recovery on the fact that the
victim was a paying patient, a serious question of application of the
rule arises. As pointed out by the dissent in the Pierce case, the
majority made no attempt to define the term "paying patient". What
is meant by "the prevailing rate"? What of the patient who pays as
much (or more) than he can afford, but still less than what might be
found to be the prevailing rate? When the problem occurs in the case
of a private school or hospital, it might be found that even though the
patient or student pays the full rate, he is still only carrying a part of
the burden, and the school or hospital may be doing as much as matching his payments to render him the service he receives. Would such
facts deprive the plaintiff of recovery if proven? These questions are
not answered by the court. Instead the position has apparently been
taken that the future cases will be decided on the basis of public policy,
and the determination of the policy has been left to the next generation
of the bench and bar.
Another possible basis of distinction between the two principal cases
is that made on the nature of the charity itself. Let us look again at
the words of the holding in the Lyon case. "We do not wish to extend
[the holding in the Pierce case] to apply to a non-profit, religious
organization which transports children, without charge, to and from
Sunday school in order that they may receive a spiritualeducation and
eventually become members of a church organization."" (emphasis
supplied) Is it to be supposed that by these words the court intended
to emphasize the non-profit aspect of the defendant's operations? 5 As
49 Rutledge, J., in President and Directors of Georgetown Hospital v. Hughes, 130
F.2d 810, 827 (D.C.Cir. 1942).
so 47 Wn.2d at 204, 287 P.2d at 129.
5
1The hearts and flowers appeal of the argument of the respondent points up this
aspect of the case which was apparently urged upon the court with success in the Lyon
case. "... . We respectfully urge upon the court that it is far too sweeping an assertion
that every charitable use, that every real charitable work, is to be deprived of the rule
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pointed out previously it has been the general rule that the charitable
character of an institution is not destroyed merely on account of the
fact that such institution exacts charges for services rendered by it."
Furthermore, there was no indication in the Pierce case that the court
intended a deviation from this general rule. Indeed, the very language
of the problem posed by the court referred to a "charitable, non-profit
hospital."'" It would be difficult to presume that the court in the Lyon
case intended to make a distinction between "so-called charitable
works" where a charge might be made for the service, and "really charitable works" where there is no charge. The answer to the riddle
'when is a charity not a charity' is not to be found either in the Washington law or in common sense.
It is true that a charitable corporation as such must render its beneficial works as a charity. Clearly, if it renders no service except those
for which it receives a full compensation, it is a business, and not a
charity, and as such would be denied the immunity granted the latter.
This is not to say, however, that the exaction of a compensation from
those who are able to pay will render the concern non-charitable. The
test in Washington has never been whether there was a charge for the
rendition of services, but rather that "the income is devoted to the
accomplishment of the charitable purpose . . . and that no portion
thereof is diverted to private profit or advantage.""4 If the court in the
Lyon case intended to change this test, it is apparent that it did not do
so in fact.
On the other hand, it could have been the intention of the court to put
emphasis on the religious nature of the defendant. In this regard, it
should be noted that heretofore there has been no distinction made in
the cases on this ground between charitable hospitals, schools or
churches. The immunity has not been granted to an institution because
of immunity and that it is not sound thinking to insist that times have changed as far
as the reasons for granting immunity to really charitable works are concerned.
"In this connection let us bear in mind that the respondent now before the court, the

Evangelical Church of the little community of Tumwater, so far bent on the care of
the souls of its members as to provide certain of them free transportation, is not to
be compared with a hospital providing bed and service for a dollar consideration.
While it is law now of this state that the so-called charitable hospital providing bed
and service for a consideration is on the identical footing with the profit-making clinic,
it is not yet the law of this state that the truly charity dispensing organization is on

the self-same footing. It is earnestly, devoutly to be hoped that it never shall." Brief
of Respondent, pp. 39-40.
V Tribble v. Missionary Sisters of Sacred Heart, 137 Wash. 326, 242 Pac. 372

(1926) ; Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P.2d 807 (1939) ; Canney v. Sisters of
Charity, 15 Wn.2d 325, 130 P.2d 899 (1942).

r3 43
r4

Wn.2d at 162, 260 P2d at 766.

Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 98 P.2d 807 (1939).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[AUTUMN

it was a church or a hospital, but because it was a charity, and the
reasons propounded for the granting or denying of the immunity are
the same in both cases. 5 Indeed, that the analysis is the same in all of
these cases is recognized by the court in the Pierce case."
Practical difficulties there are if this is the new basis upon which
immunity will be granted or denied in Washington. Not only will the
court be faced with the ordinary problem of what to do with the church
group which engages in the operation of a so-called "proprietary"
activity (e.g., a hospital) but there doubtless will be litigation on the
question of which group will be able to qualify as "religious" for the
purposes of the immunity. Nothing more need be said on this point, as
the imagination can furnish infinite possibilities.
An interesting legal question is also posed in this area. It requires
no more than a reference. Would an immunity from tort liability
granted to churches because of the religious nature of their work constitute a violation of the separation of church and state under the
5 7

Federal Constitution?

It is the firm conviction of the writer that the Lyon and Pierce cases
are inconsistent. Perhaps the inconsistency can be rationalized by
saying that old rules die hard. The Lyon case did present an unusually
appealing case for the defendant to a sympathetic court. Unfortunately, however, it is still true that hard cases make bad law.
5 Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 389,
219 N.W. 463, 62 A.L.R. 716 (1928) (immunity denied); Williams v. Church Home
for Females and Infirmary for the Sick, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S.W.2d 753, 62 A.L.R. 721
(1928) (immunity granted) ; St. Mary's Academy of Sisters v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463,
238 Pac. 22, 42 A.L.R. 964 (1925) (school; immunity denied); Foster v. Roman
Catholic Church, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230, 25 A.L.R.2d 1 (1950); Weiss v. Swedish
Hospital, 16 Wn.2d 446, 133 P.2d 978 (1943) in which the court said, at page 454:
"When we consider the great diversity of variant rules which might be adopted, and
at the same time remember that the rule with which we are here dealing does not
apply to hospitals alone but to churches, educational institutions, Y.M.C.A.'s, social
welfare organizations, and, in general, to the various organizations engaged in philanthropic, benevolent, and charitable work, it is at once manifest that a change in
the rule, particularly its complete abolishment, would have far-reaching and, perhaps,
unimagined and unintended consequences."
56 See 43 Wn.2d at 171, 260 P2d at 770.
5 While the first amendment only declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of a religion, the fourteenth amendment has rendered
the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; moreover, the recent case of Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), held that state action, as that phrase is understood for the purpose
of the fourteenth amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms.
"...judicial action is not immunized from the operation of the fourteenth amendment
simply because it is taken pursuant to the state's common law policy." See also Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S.
321 (1941). The prohibition thus written into the fourteenth amendment of every form
of public aid or support for religion would, in the opinion of the writer, be clearly
violated by a rule granting immunity from tort liability to churches because they are
churches, whatever other reasons may be given in its support.
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THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY

It is suggested that a careful consideration of the language of the
Pierce decision will lead to the conclusion that the court intended to
abolish the immunity rule in all its aspects in Washington. We should
not expect so narrow a construction of that case from the same court
which so recently had decided it-and in so doing overruled a precedent of long standing, using broad language, and rejecting an argument
that such a rule should be changed only by legislation because of the
broad public policy considerations involved.
The more unfortunate aspects of the Lyon decision will make themselves apparent in the future. One may wonder whether the immunity
rule now applies only to "non-profit, religious organizations which
transport children, without charge, to and from Sunday school.

. ."

or

if it will be given a broader reading. In any case it means difficulties
for the attorney when, for example, he is consulted by his local church
group as to whether it should drop the liability insurance which it has
been carrying on its Sunday school bus. If this problem appears to be
one that is answerable after the Lyon case, consider the possibilities of a
suit by (a) an injured pedestrian; (b) an injured passenger helping
transport cakes to the church bazaar; (c) a passenger who has paid
a fare.
The trend of decisions in this country has been away from immunity
and toward liability. With no reasons for the continuation of the rule,
it cannot be doubted that in time the immunity will pass from us. It is
unfortunate that the Washington court, which recognized these facts
so well in the Pierce case, should have seen fit to raise one more
obstacle to the passing of the rule. It is even more unfortunate that the
obstacle should have the characteristics of a cloud of smoke with undetermined dimensions.

